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., 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
A. FRED FLEMING, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
FLE~iiNG FELT COMPANY, a 
corporation, and JOSEPH H. 
FELT and MARIE FELT, 
Defendants and .A.ppella;nts. 
Case 
No. 8732 
Brief of Defendants 
and Appellants 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
During the month of July, 1953, Joseph H. Felt 
and Fred Fleming entered into negotiations for the merg-
ing of their businesses. (R. 56) Joseph H. Felt and his 
wife Marie Felt were the principal stockholders and the 
President and Vice-President, respectively, of the J. H. 
Felt Motor Supply Company, a Utah corporation. J o-
seph H. Felt and Marie Felt had been associated in the 
auto supply business constantly since 1931. (R. 204) Mr. 
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Felt had not been well and desired to make plans for his 
subsequent retirement. (R. 204) 
Fleming likewise operated an automotive supply 
business known as A. Fred Fleming Company, and had 
been engaged in that type of business since 1949. (R. 57) 
Joseph H. Felt in substance told Fleming that he, 
Felt, was getting old and that he wanted to retire from 
the business and that he wanted someone to manage it 
and take it over. (R. 58) 
On September 1, 1953, Fleming transferred his mer-
chandise and commenced business jointly with the Felts 
and immediately assumed his duties as General Manager 
of the Fleming-Felt Company. At this time details of a 
formal contract had not been agreed upon. (R. 62, 63) 
The first tentative draft of their mutual agreement 
was not prepared for another six weeks. (R. 63) It was 
not acceptable to Fleming. (R. 105) He likewise objected 
to the second and third drafts of the agreement. (R. 105) 
He admitted that when the drafts were delivered to him 
he studied them oYer and knew what was in them (R.105) 
Finally, during the last part of November, 1953, 
nearly three months after they had been operating to-
gether (R. 58), the formal contract was signed. (R. 105) 
However, it was dated August 31, 1953. (R. 8) Fleming 
14tatPs unequi,·oeally that he knew what he "'"as signing. 
( n. J 0;>) During the approxima tc three-month period fol-
lo\\'illg their eommeneement of busi1wss together and the 
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signing of the contract, Fleming and the Felts were sell-
ing from the inventory. (R. 58) Fleming had been through 
the inventory several times. (R. 58) He had questioned 
what he considered to be obsolete merchandise. (R. 59) 
He had full access to the inventory and merchandise prior 
to the signing of the contract. (R. 58, 106) 
Upon the signing of the contract, he received the 
Felts' stock in the coporation to hold, pursuant to the 
terms of the agreement. (R. 106, 107) 
After eight or nine months, some friction developed 
over some of Fleming's proposed changes in the business. 
(R. 68, 69) 
In January of 1955, Joseph H. Felt accused Fleming 
of losing money in the business, (R. 70) to which Flem-
ing took exception. Thereafter relations became strained, 
resulting in Fleming's firing Joseph H. Felt in March, 
1955, (R. 73, 74) and Marie Felt in April, 1955. Marie 
Felt was subsequently voted a salary as secretary-treas-
urer of the corporation by the Board of Directors of the 
Company. (R. 74) 
On June 8, 1955, Fleming made an appointment with 
the Felts to meet at the business office at about 7 :30 in the 
evening. (R. 226, 227) Then, standing on his rights under 
the contract, he offered to pay $200.00 as the first pay-
ment on the purchase of the Felt stock. Fleming claims 
the Felts refused to accept the money (R. 108), but the 
Felts asked Fleming to accompany them to discuss the 
matter with Felts' attorney. (R. 108) Mrs. F1 elt testified 
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that the money was not unequivocally refused but that 
Mr. Felt said that this should go through the proper chan-
nels. (R. 228) The Court made no finding on this matter. 
Fleming then resigned as General Manager and gave 
Joseph Felt the keys. (R. 108, 109) Again Joseph Felt 
asked him to go to the attorney's office and discuss the 
matter. (R. 109) 
Beginning with the commencement of operations to-
gether, September 1, 1953, Fleming received a salary of 
$400.00 per month plus all car operating expenses during 
all the time that he served as General ::Manager of the 
company, i. e. to June 8, 1955, which salary was equal to 
the total salary of both of the Felts together for the same 
period. (R. 2, 86) 
On July 26, 1955, Fleming offered to return to the 
corporation all of the shares he had purchased at the out-
set, and then demanded the sum of $13,511.52 or, in the 
alternative, stock in trade of such value. (H. 130, 131) 
Finally, on July 29, 1955, nearly 23 months after they 
had commenced operations together, Fleming filed suit 
against the Felts, seeking, among other relief, a recission 
of the agreement dated August 31, 1953, on the alleged 
grounds that the Felts had misrepresented the value of 
their inventory; that he, Fleming, had been wrongfully 
deprivt~d of his duties as general manager, and that the 
}1\,lts had misrepresented their intentions to let Fleming 
manage tlw business. It wa.s also alleged that Joseph H. 
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Felt had misrepresented his intentions to retire from the 
business. (R. 1-7) 
Upon the trial of the case the Court, notwithstanding 
the nearly two years of operations under the contract, 
rescinded the contract of August 31, 1953, as ''inequitable 
and illegal'' and granted a money judgment against all 
defendants in the sum of $13,512.00, together with interest 
thereon at six per cent from the date of the contract, 
amounting to $3,311.08. The Court even made a finding 
of fraud. 
The judgment of rescission was on outright money 
judgment against the defendants for the full value of 
Fleming's inventory as of the commencement of opera-
tions together, and with no provision whatsoever for the 
return to Fleming of any of his merchandise or merchan-
dise identical with what he had transferred to the busi-
ness, and with no consideration being given to what Flem-
ing personlly took out of the business during the nearly 
two years of operations. 
From the judgment thus entered, and from the order 
refusing to amend the Findings of Fact and Conclusion of 
Law and Judgment, the defendants have appealed. 
POINTS RELIED UPON 
I. THE TRIAL COURT HAS MISCONSTRUED 
THE CONTRACT DATED AUGUST 31, 
1953, AND HAS ERRED IN RESCINDING 
THE SAME AS BEING INEQUITABLE 
AND ILLEGAL. 
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II. FINDING OF FACT NO. 8 CANNOT REA-
SONABLY BE SUSTAINED BY THE 
EVIDENCE. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING 
TO RULE THAT FLEMING, ON THE 
GROUNDS OF LACHES, WAIVER AND 
ESTOPPEL, WAS BARRED FROM SEEK-
ING A RESCISSION OF THE CONTRACT. 
IV. FINDINGS OF FACTS NOS. 7 AND 11 CAN-
NOT REASONABLY BE SUSTAINED BY 
THE EVIDENCE, AND EVEN IF THEY 
WERE, THEY DO NOT SUPPORT THE 
JUDGMENT OF RECISSION. 
V. THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A 
MONEY JUDGMENT. 
ARGU:JIEXT 
POINT NO. I 
THE TRIAL COURT HAS MISCONSTRUED THE 
CONTRACT DATED AUGUST 31, 1953, AND HAS 
ERRED IN RESCINDING THE SA~IE AS BEING 
INEQUITABLE AND ILLEGAL. 
As far as the trial court was concerned, the legality 
of the contract was the Yital issue in this case-a point 
which was never pleaded, argued or even suggested by 
eounsel for plaintiff. The trial judge wrote a memoran-
dum decision, the entirety of which "~as devoted to an 
attack npon the legality of the contract. (R. :2GG-:2G8) 
The judgment rescinding the contract was specifically 
granted upon its supposedly being ··inequitable and ille-
gal,'' for tlw first paragraph of the judgment of n)scis-
sion (H. ~7;)) ~1weifieally rescinded the contract as 
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"inequitable and illegal." Because of the importance at-
tached to the contract by the trial court it is set forth in 
its entirety. 
AGREEMENT 
rrHIS AGREEMENT' made and entered into as of 
the 31st day of August, 1953, by and between 
FLE1iiNG-FELT COMPANY, a Utah corpora-
tion, First Party, hereinafer called the Cor-
poration; JOSEPH H. FELT and MARIE F. 
FELT, his wife, Second Parties, hereinafter called 
Sellers; and A. FRED FLEMING, Third Party, 
hereinafter called Fleming, 
WITNESSETH: 
Sellers are the owners of stock of Fleming-
Felt Company, a Utah corporation, in the amount 
set forth as follows: 
J. H. Felt____________________ 4,659 
Marie F. Felt ____________ 20,575 
25,234 
Fleming is the owner of a business in Provo, 
Utah, the net worth of which business is $13,511.52 
as shown by the balance sheet attached hereto and 
maraked Exhibit" A." The balance sheet of J. H. 
Felt Motor Supply Company is attached hereto 
and is marked Exhibit "B." 
Now THEREFORE, in consideration of their mu-
tual promises herein contained, the parties hereto 
agree as follows: 
1. Fleming agrees to sell and transfer and 
does hereby sell and transfer to the Corporation 
all of the stock in trade and accounts receivable 
listed on Exhibit ''A'' attached hereto, which 
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stock in trade Fleming represents is free of all 
encumbrance and lien. In full payment therefor 
the Corporation will issue to Fleming 13,512 
shares of stock of the Corporation at par values. 
2. As set forth herein, Sellers will sell to 
Fleming such 25,234 shares owned by them and 
all additional shares hereafter to be issued to Sell-
ers by the Corporation, for the price of $33,269.00 
plus $1.00 for each such additional share hereafter 
to be issued to Sellers. 
3. Sellers upon the execution of this agree-
ment will note the following on all of their cer-
tificates of stock: "This certificate is held subject 
to an agreement dated August 31, 1953, between 
Fleming-Felt Company, Joseph H. Felt and Marie 
F. Felt and A. Fred Fleming, is non-negotiable, 
and cannot be transferred, and mortgaged, as-
signed or pledged.'' Sellers will thereupon 
deliver such stock to Fleming, who will hold such 
stock for the benefit of Sellers pending the per-
formance of the said contract. Upon payment to 
Sellers by Fleming of the full purchase price to-
gether with inten'st thereon as herein set forth, 
Fleming will present such certificates to the Sell-
ers for endorsement, and the Sellers will there-
upon endorse such certificates and all other cer-
tificates of the Corporation owned by them will 
present such certificates to the Corporation for 
issuance to Fleming of such number of shares of 
stock in the name of Fleming or his assignee. 
4. Fleming shall be general manager of the 
Corporation so long as the obligations of the Cor-
poration are met a11d so long as the obligations of 
Fleming to the Sellers as set forth herein are met 
nt thl' times herein specified, and so long as the 
Corporation does not show a loss for two con-
sPctd iYl' ypa rs, and so long as Fleming acts in 
good faith for the benefit of the Corporation. In 
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the event of a failure of any one or more of these 
conditions, the directors of the Corporation shall 
be free in their discretion to appoint a new 
manager. 
5. So long as Joseph H. Felt and Marie F. 
Felt or either of them is employed by the corpo-
ration, the Corporation will pay to the Sellers or 
either of them the same salary, withdrawals, bo-
nuses, dividends and any other payments each 
month that it pays Fleming, which amount shall 
never be less than $200.00 per month. So long as 
either Joseph H. Felt or Marie F. Felt is em-
ployed by the Corporation no payment on the pur-
chase price of the stock need be made nor shall in-
terest start running on the purchase price. After 
Joseph H. Felt and Marie F. Felt are no longer 
employed by the Corporation, they shall not par-
ticipate in any salaries, withdrawals, bonuses, div-
idends or other payments from the Corporation. 
6. On the first day of the month following 
the termination of the employment by the Corpo-
ration of either Joseph H. Felt or Marie F. Felt, 
whoever is the last person employed by the Cor-
poration, Fleming shall pay on the purchase price 
$200.00 or more, and shall pay $200.00 or more 
thereafter on the first day of each month, which 
sum shall be applied by the Sellers on the said 
purchase price of the contract after the deduction 
of interest at 6% per annum on the unpaid balance 
of the said purchase price. Said interest shall be 
charged from the date of the termination of the 
employment of either Joseph H. Felt or Marie F. 
Felt, whoever is the last person employed l>y the 
Corporation. 
7. Sellers are the owners of the following 
described property in Salt Lake County, Utah: 
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Commencing at the Northwest corner of 
Lot 8, Block 16, Plat ''A,'' Salt Lake City 
Survey, thence East 321f2 feet, thence 
South 7 rods, thence West 32¥2 feet, 
thence North 7 rods to beginning. 
Such property is now rented to the Corporation 
at the rental of $200.00 per month. Sellers will not 
increase such rental during the next five years, 
unless substantial improvements or additions to 
the building or property are made, or unless there 
is a breach of any of the terms of this contract by 
Fleming. 
8. In the event that Fleming fails to make 
any payment or payments set forth herein at the 
time or times such payment or payments are 
herein set forth to be made, Sellers may at their 
option demand redelivery to them of all such stock 
held by Fleming, and upon such demand, Fleming 
will redeliver such certificates to the Sellers. In 
the event Fleming will fail to make such delivery 
within 60 days after demand therefor is made, 
Sellers may at their option request the CorJ}Ora-
tion to cancel such certificates, and the Corpo-
ration will thereupon cancel such certificates 
without demanding bond or other security there-
for, and will reissue to Sellers an equivalent num-
ber of shares. In the event Fleming fails to make 
any payment or payments set forth herein to be 
made at the time or times such payment or pay-
ments are herein sd forth to be made, and Sellers 
demand return to them of the certificates held by 
Fleming, all payments made on the purchase of 
such stock shall be retained by the Sellers as liqui-
da t t>d damagt>s for the breach of this contract. 
Fleming will not pay more than 30% of the total 
purchasP pricl) in any one yf'ar. In the eYent more 
than $200.00 is paid in an~· one month, such excess 
paymc.)11t shall not apply on any future payment, 
10 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and shall not excuse the failure to make any fur-
ther monthly payment in full when due. 
9. Sellers shall retain legal title to all cer-
tificates of stock delivered to Fleming and shall 
exercise all voting rights thereon until the pur-
chase price of such stock is paid in full. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereunto 
set their hand and seal at Salt Lake City, Utah, as 
of the day and year first above written. 
Attest: 
FLEMING-FELT COMPANY 
By s/d Joseph H. Felt 
President 
CoRPORATION 
s/d Joseph H. Felt 
s/d Marie F. Felt 
SELLERS 
s/ d A. Fred Fleming 
FLEMING 
s/d Marie F. Felt, Secretary. 
(R 8-11) 
The Court characterizes the contract as ''unilateral.'' 
This is obviously incorrect. What the Court really seems 
to be saying is that the contract is lacking in mutuality. 
"Unilateral" is frequently employed by courts to express 
absence of "mutuality." 17 C. J. S., Contracts, Sec. 8, 
P. 327. But wherein is the contract lacking in mutuality1 
Even a cursory examination of the contract reveals 
that there are mutual covenants and promises binding 
upon all parties. This is so obvious as to require no com-
ment. No doubt the conclusion of the trial court as to the 
11 
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illegality of the contract was the result of a gross misun-
derstanding of it. A comparison between the Court's 
findings and the provisions of the contract clearly show 
the misinterpretations. 
Finding No. 4 (R. 271) is patently in error. Said 
the Court: 
'' ... As long as either of the Felts worked for 
the corporation, Fleming could not make payments 
on the purchase of the Felt stock, but when neither 
of the Felts was employed by the corporation, 
Fleming was obligated to proceed with the pur-
chase of the stock, payable at $200 per month; ... " 
(Emphasis supplied) 
Contrary to the above portion of Finding No. 4, Par-
agraph 5 of the contract provides that so long as either 
Joseph H. Felt or Marie F. Felt is employed by the cor-
poration, no payment on the purchase price of the stock 
need be made, nor shall interest start running on the pur-
chase price. ( R. 9) 
The Court, in Finding Xo. 4 (R. 271), started that 
''It would take Fleming about ~4 years to pay for 
the stock he was compelled to buy ... '· 
But Paragraph 6 of the contract provides that Flem-
ing could pay $200 or m o rc each month, and Paragraph 8 
expressly contemplates the possibility of a payment of 
thirty per cent of the purchase price in any year.(R.10, 11) 
In Finding No.6 (R. ~71), the Court found: 
''That the only thing Fleming could get out 
of tlw eontraet, which was wholly unilateral, was 
1lw right to be general manager ... • · 
12 
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Such a statement, of course, is completely contradic-
tory, for if Fleming could get anything out of the con-
tract, it was not unilateral, i. e., lacking in mutuality. The 
finding further seems to minimize what Fleming consid-
ered to be very important, and that was to be general 
manager. The Finding further ignores completely Flem-
ing's contractual right to purchase the Felt stock. 
The contract was not entered into overnight. Flem-
ing had brought his stock into the business, and had been 
operating with the Felts for three months prior to its 
execution. (R. 58, 62, 63, 105) Fleming objected to the 
first three drafts of the contract and still had some reser-
vations and further negotiations were had. (R. 105) The 
contract was then signed. Fleming admitted he knew the 
provisions and understood the same. (R. 105) These un-
disputed facts were completely ignored by the trial court. 
Under the terms of the contract, all parties had mu-
tual rights and obligations. They could be specifically 
enforced. The contract is not inequitable or illegal. It 
represents an agreement finally reached after numerous 
revisions and negotiation. But even if it were inequitable, 
the law does not permit the Court to step in now and 
rescind it on that basis. 
The following general statement of the law in 17 
C. J. S., Sec. 127, P. 474, is in point, is fundamental and 
is supported by a multitude of authorities: 
''The slightest consideration is sufficient to sup-
port the most onerous obligations; the inadequacy, 
as has been well said, is for the parties to consider 
13 
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at the time of making the agreement, and not for 
the court when it is sought to be enforced." 
Willison on Contracts, Vol. 1, Sec. 115, P. 389, 394, 
is to the same effect: 
"It is an 'elementary principle that the law 
will not enter into an inquiry as to the adequacy 
of the consideration.' This rule is almost as old 
as the law of consideration itself. Therefore, any-
thing which fulfills the requirements of considera-
tion will support a promise whatever may by the 
comparative value of the consideration, and of 
the thing promised.'' "' * * 
''In equity as at law, adequacy of considera-
tion is of no importance in determining existence 
of a contract, but it is of importance sometimes as 
a factor in determining the right of the plaintiff to 
specific performance.'' 
The Court concluded (R. 273) that the contract was 
unenforceable against Felt. This is not warranted. Flem-
ing held the Felt stock. Upon payment of the purchase 
price, he could demand endorsement and thus enjoy all 
rights thereunder. He acted as general manager of the 
Fleming-Felt Company for nearly two years. He never 
had his duties as such spelled out in the contract. They 
would be, therefore, the usual reasonable duties of a 
general manager, as would reasonably be inferred from 
the eontrad and all the circumstances. These duties if 
Iwec~fw ry could ha YC been defined by dec.Iaratory judg-
mcllt and Fleming could haYe, if necessary. with the aid 
of the court, prevented interference with his conduct a.s 
g-<'IH'ra 1 manager. 
14 
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There is no basis whatsoever for sitgmatizing the 
contract as inequitable. The glaring inconsistencies he-
tween the Court's findings thereon and the actual provi-
sions thereof only suggest that the contract was never 
carefully read by the trial court. 
The contract is obviously one made for the protection 
of both parties. The Felts were interested in seeing that 
the business operated properly under the new manage-
ment so that thy could withdraw with the assurance that 
their monthly payments would be kept up. 
Wherein is the contract illegal~ Nothing in the Find-
ings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Memorandum Decision 
or Judgment of the Court, makes so much as one sugges-
tion wherein the contract is illegal. 
POINT NO. II 
FINDING OF FACT NO. 8 CANNOT REASON-
ABLY BE SUSTAINED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
Finding No. 8, as entered by the Court, is as follov:s 
(R. 272): 
''8. That Marie Felt and Joseph H. Felt, in 
order to induce the plaintiff to enter into said 
agreement, knowingly made false and fraudulent 
representations to plaintiff and falsely represent-
ed that he, Mr. Felt, was going to retire and plain-
tiff would have a free hand in running the business 
as general manager; that plaintiff relied on said 
representations in entering into said a,gn~ement 
to his detriment.'' 
This is an equity proceeding. This Court, therefore, 
has a duty to review the record and weigh the evidence 
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and determine whether or not the evidence supports the 
Findings of Fact. See for example, Christensen v. Niel-
sen, 54 P. (2d) 430 (Utah, 1936); Greco v. Grako, et al., 
39 P. (2d) 318 (Utah, 1934); Chapman v. Troy Laundry 
Co., 47 P. (2d) 1054 (Utah, 1935); Buzianis v. Buzianis, 
16 P. (2d) 413 (Utah, 1932). 
According to Fleming, the sum total of the represen-
tations of the Felts with respect to the retirement of Mr. 
Felt and the running of the business by :Jfr. Fleming is as 
follows: 
''A. He proposed that I bring my merchandise up 
and put in with him in Salt Lake. I had a 
sales organization, which he didn't have; 
that, and I asked him about what amount of 
money it would entail, and he told me about 
$17,000.00 or $18,000.00, and I questioned 
him on wh}~ he wanted to sell the business. 
He said he wanted to retire; he said he want-
ed to travel: he would like to take his wife 
and go to Germany. He said he was getting 
old, and felt that he should retire in the busi-
ness and he wanted someone to manage it, to 
take it over. (R. 57) 
Q. Did vou haYe anY other discussion at that 
parti~ular time e~neerning the terms of the 
purrhase ~ (R. 58) 
A. I told him that I was not in a position to buy 
his business: that I had all the money that I 
had tied up in my own busi1wss ; and he told 
me that all he wanted was seeurit}~ for his 
wife, that. if I would put m~~ stork in with 
his company, that I could pay him $200 a 
month for the stock. (R.. 58) 
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Q. Did he indicate who was going to run this 
new business? (R. 58) 
A. He told me that he wanted someone to man-
age the business; he wanted to retire; he 
wanted someone to run the business. He had 
come to the point he wanted to retire, and he 
wanted to do a little traveling, and he wanted 
someone to manage it; he told me he had in-
vestigated me for the past year ... '' (R 58) 
A. '' ... Another thing that I was concerned 
about, prior to signing of that contract, was 
that he made himself president of the corpo-
ration and I said, 'Mr. Felt, if you are going 
to retire, why-:do you make yourself president 
of the corporation?' 'Well,' he says, 'that is 
just an honorary position,' he says, 'many 
presidents of corporations are retired,' and 
he mentioned that in the east there was a cor-
poration that - the president was retired, 
that he told me that I would be the general 
manager, that I would have the full manage-
ment of that business." (R 59) 
Q. Mr. Fleming, did Joseph H. Felt ever tell 
you when he was going to retire? (R. 66) 
A. Yes; at the- before the signing of this con-
tract - we had a discussion about him re-
tiring, and he said at that time that he was 
going to retire as soon as I became acquaint-
ed with the business, and I turned to Mrs. 
Felt, and I said, 'Mrs. Felt, -it says in the 
contract that, if either one of them are in the 
business, if one retires and the other stays in 
the business, that they would continue to 
draw the same amount of salary or dividends 
or what that- they both draw it' -and I 
said, 'Mrs. Felt, are you going to retire at 
that time?' And she told me she was only 
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in the business because of her husband and 
she wasn't there because of her wanting to 
be in the business, and that she certainly was 
going to retire when he retired. (R. 66-67) 
Q. What was the approximate date of this 
discussion~ (R. 67) 
A. That was the day that the contract was 
signed. ( R. 67) 
Q. Was it prior to the time it was signed? 
(R. 67) 
A. It was prior to the time it was signed." 
(R. 67) 
Now, the elements of fraud essential to voiding a 
contract are well settled: 
''Broadly speaking, and subject to qualifica-
tions hereinafter pointed out, the elements essen-
tial to fraud avoiding a contract, as more particu-
larly stated infra this and following sections, are: 
Representation; falsity; materiality to to the con-
tract; knowledge and deceptive intent of the fraud 
feasor; ignorance, deception, and relianee of the 
parties seeking relief; and his inducement by such 
representations to contract to his injury. In de-
fining fraud Yitiating a contract, the eourts fre-
quently state such elements in whole or in part." 
17 C. J. S., Contracts, Sec. 154(b), P. 506. 
This ( '1ourt, in the case of Adamson'· Brockbank, 112 
Utah;)~, 185 P. (2d) 264, (1941) has set worth at page 275 
with part ienlarity the elements that must be proved to 
PHta hlish fraud. 
''In order to establish a charge of this char-
ndt>r the complainant must show by clear and de-
cisin_~ proof: First, that the defendant has made 
a rt>pn'st'llta tioll in regard to a material fact; sec-
ondly, that such represt'ntation is false; thirdly, 
18 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
that such representation was not actually believed 
by the defendant, on reasonable grounds, to be 
true; fourthly, that it was made with intent that it 
should be acted on; fifthly, that it was acted on by 
complainant to his damage; and sixthly, that in so 
acting on it the complainant was ignorant of its 
falsity, and reasonably believed it to be true." 
Even if the alleged representations by Joseph H. Felt 
about his future retirement were in fact made as reported 
by Fleming, they are, at most, representations of inten-
tion or expectation: 
"Ordinarily, misrepresentations amounting to 
fraud which will void a contract must relate to 
past or present facts and cannot consist of unful-
filled promises or predictions respecting future 
events, especially not where intent to deceive is 
absent. However, as a general rule, which in some 
jurisdictions has been embodied in statute, a prom-
ise made as a means of deception and with the 
intention of breaking it is ordinarily classified as 
fraud warranting relief from a contract induced 
thereby, although there are authorities to the 
effect that promises made without intent to keep 
them do not constitute fraud vitiating a contract.'' 
17 C. J. S., Contracts, Sec. 157, P. 509, 510. 
The law announced by this Court in previous cases 
is to the same effect. In the case of State v. Brucf', 1 Utah 
(2d) 136, 262 P. (2d) 960, (1953), the defendant was 
charged with making and passing a worthless check. The 
check involved was postdated and the question was 
whether he was guilty under the applicable statute. Said 
the Court at page 962: 
''This amounts to a promise to he performed 
in the future. Obviously such a promise mny he 
19 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
made in good faith, but the plans go awry. Unex-
pected or uncontrolled events intervene, or a bona 
fide change of mind occurs, any one of which would 
negative the existence of any intent to defraud at 
the time the check was passed, thus eliminating an 
element essential to constitute the crime. Such 
reasoning is the basis of the general rule that a 
promise of performance in the future will usually 
not support a charge of fraud." 
As authority for the last statement, the Court cited 
with approval 37 C. J. S., Fraud, Sec. 11, and 95 A.L.R. 
486, 496, et seq. 
The general rule regarding promises and statements 
as to future events as constituting fraud is summed up 
by the annotator in 51 A.L.R. 46, 49, and is in harmony 
with what has already been said: 
''The general rule, which is supported by nu-
merous decisions in almost all jurisdictions, is that 
fraud must relate to a present or pre-existing 
fact, and cannot ordinarily be predicated on un-
fulfilled promises or statements as to future 
events. There are various reasons for this gen-
eral rule, a.ppliea ble according to the particular 
circumstances. The usual grounds assigned are 
that representations and promises should be re-
g-arded merely as statements of opinion, hopes or 
expPdations, on which the party to whom they are 
made has no legal right to rely, that a statement as 
to a future r·Yent cannot, in the Yery nature of the 
easl', be false when made.·· 
]1~,·pn if it be conceded that Joseph H. Felt made the 
prPeis{' n'prt>st>ntatiolls alleged by Fleming and as set 
forth ahon>, then' is a total absence in the record of any 
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evidence showing that the same statements were not made 
with bona fide intention. There is not one iota of evidence 
to show that there was any intent to deceive. There is 
nothing to show that such statements were not honestly 
made. The contract itself contemplated that Fleming's 
position as general manager could be terminated if the 
corporation showed a loss for two consecutive years, or 
should Fleming act in bad faith contrary to the interests 
of the corporation, suggesting that Mr. Felt would use 
that time to see if Fleming became sufficiently acquainted 
with the business and demonstrated his ability to make it 
pay. See Paragraph 4 of the contract. (R. 9) Mr. Felt 
could not be expected to retire while apprehensible as to 
whether Fleming was making the business pay. 
It is noted that there is no alleged representation by 
Mr. Felt or anyone else as to who would be the judge as 
to when and whether Mr. Fleming was sufficiently 
acquainted with the business. rrhere is certainly no basis 
for inferring fraud from the mere fact that Mr. Felt had 
not retired by the end of eight months or twenty-three 
months, for that matter. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Minnesota in the 
case of Crosby et al. v. Crescent Oil Co. of illimu·sofa, 255 
N.W. 853 (Minn., 1934) following an earlier Minnesota 
decision in the case of 111.cCreight v. Davey TrPe R:qJert 
Co., 254 N.W. 623, reiterated the rule: 
"It may be added that fraud cannot be prPdi-
cated upon the mere fact that a promise has been 
broken. * * * There must be evidence to justify a 
trier of fact in concluding that, when tlw promise 
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was made, there was no intention of performing it. 
* * * It would be as wrong morally as legally, as 
offensive to logic as to law, to hold that mere de-
nial and non-performance are evidence that, if a 
promise was made, it was made fraudulently.*** 
Bad, indeed, would be the case of the honest man 
who has made no such promise, if when falsely 
charged with it, he may not deny it without having 
his truth considered as some evidence either that 
there was such undertaking or that it was deceit-
fully made." 
To the same effect is the case of Conzelmann '·North-
west Poultry and Dairy Prod. Co., 225 P. (2d) 757 {Ore., 
1950) In this case there was a contractual promise of the 
defendants to make certain replacements of original tur-
keys with others of like weight, grade, etc. In this respect 
the contract had been breached. Said the Court at 
page 765: 
''The promise of defendants to make such re-
placements was an agreement to do something in 
the future. Because of their breach of contract in 
failing to fully perform may it be inferred that at 
the time of making the promise they had no intent 
to carry out their undertaking J? ·' 
The (\mrt pointed out that fraud was ne\er pre-
sumed, noted the burden that a person alleging fraud was 
undt>r in P~tablishing it, and then went on to say: 
"It is well l'stablished that fraud cannot be 
pn'dieated upon a promise to do something in the 
fut nn>, unless the 1wrson making the promise, at 
t ht' time hl• madl• it, had no intention of perform-
ing. Hansen , .. Holmberg, 176 Or. 113, 156 P. (2d) 
t)/1; Bond, .. Uraf, 163 Or. :264. 96 P. (:2d) 1091; 
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Condit v. Bodding, supra; Sharkey v. Burlingame 
Co., 1.31 Or. 185, 282 P. 546; Dolph v. Lennon's, 
Inc., 109 Or. 336, 220 P. 161. 
"To amount to a fraudulent representation 
sufficient to constitute actionable fraud, the inten-
tion not to perform must exist at the time the 
promise to do something in the future is made, and 
such an intent formed later and carried into effect 
is insufficient.'' * * * 
''A fraudulent intent not to perform a prom-
ise may not be inferred as existing at the time the 
promise is made from the mere fact of non-per-
formance. Other circumstances of a substantial 
character must be shown in addition to non-per-
formance before such inference of wrongful intent 
may be drawn. Cameron v. Edgemont Inv. Co., 
136 Or. 385, 299 P. 698; Dolph v. Lennon's, Inc., 
supra ; Crosby v. Crescent Oil Co., 192 Minn. 98, 
255 N. W. 853; Buckhovich v. Buchovich, 82 Mont. 
1, 264 P. 930; Leichner v. First Trust Co., 133 Neb. 
170, 274 N. W. 475; Downtown Chevrolet Co. v. 
Niccum, 180 Okl. 616, 71 P. (2d) 957; Fidurski v. 
Hammil, 328 Pa. 1, 196 A. 3.'' 
See also Dowgialla v. Knevage, 294 P. (2d) 393, 398 
(Wash., 1956); Leichtner v. First Trust Co. of Lincoln, 
274 N. W. 475, 478 (Neb., 1937). 
As a matter of fact, Mr. Felt was getting along in 
years when the contract was entered into. He and Mrs. 
Felt had been associated in the business together since 
1931. (R. 204) At the time the contract was entered into 
he had not been well. ( R. 204) He had been ill at the time 
of the trial ( R. 204) and he is now deceased. (H. 287-A) 
The logical inference is that representations ns to his fu-
ture retirement were made in the utmost good faith. 
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Furthermore, the business was not in such condition 
as to justify the Felts in trusting the management to 
Fleming alone, and retiring. The business was losing 
money. (Exhibit 12-P, R. 265). Certainly there was no 
contemplation at the beginning that the Felts would re-
tire while the business was going down. The contract, 
Paragraph 4, negatived this. (R. 9) 
As to representations that Fleming would manage 
the business, of course, they were made. The written con-
tract itself contains such. Paragraph 4 of the written con-
tract ( R. 9) specifically so provided. So also was provis-
ion made as to how long he should serve and under what 
conditions he might expect to be removed. But on this 
matter the written agreement would supersede any prior 
parol representations. Proof of promissory fraud evi-
dencing a written contract cannot be made by represen-
tations contradictory to the terms of integration. Crosby 
et al. Y. Cresce,ut Oil Co. of Jliunesota, 255 N.W. 385 
(~linn., 1935); JfcCreight Y. Darey Tree Expert Co., 254 
~."\V. 623) .J[r. Felt's retirement was not even mentioned 
in the contract; it was not the important matter. What 
did mattl'r to Fleming was his managing the business, and 
on this minor point parol representations would not con-
1 rol 1 hP express writing agreed to by the parties. 
N eitlwr is that part of Finding X o. 8 to the effect that 
Fleming relied on the said statements supported by the 
p,·id('ll<'t' in tlw record. The record does show that they 
wPr<' in business together nearl~· three months before the 
ron f r:wt wns sigiH'<l. (R. 105, 106) that Sl~Yeral drafts of 
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the contract were executed (R. 105) ; that he studied over 
all of the drafts each time (R. 105), and that he finally 
executed a contract (R. 105), and that he understood the 
terms and provisions tereof. (R. 105) There was nothing 
in the contract with respect to the time when Mr. Felt 
would retire, or that he must retire at any particular 
time; and while he surely intended to retire, there is noth-
ing to suggest that such represetnations were falsely and 
fraudulently made. 
Now the scope of Finding No. 8 does not include any 
finding that there was a misrepresentation as to the qual-
ity or value of the merchandise. This was the heart of the 
plaintiff's case as pleaded and tried. The bulk of 
the trial as revealed by the record was devoted to this 
issue, but it is clear that the trial court was convinced 
there was no misrepresentation and no finding was made 
on the point. 
A careful reading of the pleadings will indicate that 
the heart of plaintiff's case was the seeking of a recis-
sion on the basis of alleged misrepresentation as to the 
obsolescence of the Felt merchandise. An examination of 
the transcript of the testimony of the trial of the case in-
dicates that the bulk of the trial was centered upon this 
Issue. 
The Court was expressly requested by counsel for 
plaintiff to find the following: 
"That Marie Felt and Joseph H. Felt, in 
order to induce the plaintiff to enter into said 
agreeent, knowingly made false and fraudulent 
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representations to plaintiff that the stock and 
trade of Joseph H. Felt Motor Supply Co. was 
worth $32, 950.76, that it did not contain any abso-
lete merchandise, and defendant, Felt, falsely rep-
resented that he was going to retire and plaintiff 
would have a free hand in running the business 
as general manager; that plaintiff relied on said 
representations in entering into said agreement 
to his detriment.'' (Emphasis supplied) 
But this Finding of Fact the Court refused to make, 
and instead found as follows (R. 272): 
"That Marie Felt and Joseph H. Felt, in 
order to induce the plaintiff to enter into said 
agreement, knowingly made false and fraudulent 
representations to plaintiff and falsely represent-
ed that he, Mr. Felt, was going to retire and plain-
tiff would have a free hand in running the business 
as general manager ; that plaintiff relied on said 
representations in entering into said agreement to 
his detriment.'' 
In other words, the trial court would not make any 
finding of fraud with respect to the quality or obsolesenc~ 
of the merchandise involved. 
POINT XO. Til 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
RULE THAT FLEMING, ON THE GROUNDS OF 
LACHES, WAIVER AND ESTOPPEL, WAS 
BARRED FROM SEEKING A RESCISSION OF 
THE CONTRACT. 
~,inuing No. 14 (R. ~73) to the effect that: 
'' ... the plaintiff is not barred by laches from 
pr:t~·ing- for a rescission of the contract. • • 
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cannot possibly be sustained by the evidence. On the con-
trary a finding should have been made by the Court that 
Fleming was barred from seeking a rescission on the 
grounds of waiver, laches and estoppel. 
Before referring to the evidence in the record, the 
Court's attention is invited to an earlier decision of this 
Court in the case of Frailey v. McGarry, 116 Utah 504, 
211 P. ( 2d) 840 ( 1949). That case involved an action to 
rescind a contract for the sale of some 900 acres of land, 
the agreement being dated December 7, 1945. It was not 
until January 15, 1947, that plaintiff gave defendant 
notice that he intended to rescind the agreement. The 
principal ground relied upon by the plaintiff as a basis 
for rescission was that he was induced to enter into the 
contract by reason of fraudulent representations made 
by the defendant regarding the availability of water. 
The Court denied rescission. The following excerpt from 
the decision is so applicable to the instant case, and so 
clearly points up parallel facts as to make it desirable 
to set it forth at length. 
''After reviewing the record of events as they 
transpired, we find it unnecessary to determine 
whether defendant, by fraud, induced the plain-
tiff to enter into the contract. There are facts 
present in the instant case which preclude plaintiff 
from rescinding the contract for the reasons he 
alleges. It is well settled by decisions from this 
court that a person claiming the right to rescind 
a contract because of misrepresentations or fraud, 
must, after discovery of the fraud, announre his 
purpose and adhere to it. rraylor v. Moore, 87 
Utah 493, 51 P. 2d 222. We have a1so held that 
the purchaser must evidence his intent to rescind 
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by some unequivocal act either by notice or some 
act amounting to notice of intent to rescind. Me-
Kellar Real Estate & Investment Co. v. Paxton, 
62 Utah 97, 218 P. 128. Moreover, a defrauded 
party, after learning the truth will not be per-
mitted to go on deriving benefits from the transac-
tion and later elect to rescind. LeVine v. White-
house, 37 Utah 260, 109 P. 2, Am. Cas. 19120,407. 
Nor will he be permitted to go on with the contract 
for the purpose of securing benefits which al-
though not directly conferred by the contract, are 
nevertheless made possible as a result of the con-
tract, only to later claim a right to rescind when he 
discovers the benefits to be acquired will not be 
great enough to compensate him for the loss he 
will sustain by reason of the fraud. 
''The fraud alleged by plaintiff as grounds 
for rescission consisted of the alleged statements 
made by defendant that there was ample water 
available to irrigate the 960 acres covered in the 
contract and that it was a mere formality to secure 
the right to drill wells in order to obtain that 
water. The falsity of such statements, if made, 
was made known to the defendant many months 
before he decided to rescind the contract. He be-
came aware of the fact. that there was a supposed 
shortage of water and that it would be more than 
a mere formality to secure permission to drill his 
wells when he received his first disappointing let-
ter from the State Engineer on March 2, 1946. Yet 
he did not notifv defendant of his intention to 
rp~cind until soni.e 10 months later. Black in his 
work on Rt~scissinn and Caneellation, Sec. 536, 
~tntt>~ the law to be: ·• • • It must he remembered 
t hn t a contract induced h~- fraud, false represen-
tntions, mistake, l'tc., is not void but only voidable, 
nnd it i~ t>HtirP1y within the right of the injured 
pnrty to affirm it or trent it as valid and subsisting. 
In this n'~ pt'C't he has a choice or election, and he 
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should not be required to make his decision in-
stantly. The true doctrine is that, after discover-
ing the facts justifying rescission, the party is en-
titled to a reasonable time in which to decide upon 
the course he will take. But this does not mean that 
he will be indulged in a vacillating or hesitating 
course of conduct, but that he must act with such 
a measure of promptness as can fairly be called 
"reasonable" with reference to all the circum-
stances of the particular case. Particularly, he 
must, if possible, avoid such a delay as will make 
the ensuing rescission injurious to the other party 
or to the intervening interests of third persons. 
He must use reasonable diligence in ascertaining 
the facts which may entitle him to rescind, and 
must act as soon after the discovery of them as 
that the opposite party will not be unnecessarily 
prejudiced by the delay. 'The rule is that he who 
would rescind the contract must offer to do so 
promptly on discovering the facts that will jus-
tify a rescission, and while he is able of himself or 
by the judgment of the court, to place the opposite 
party substantially in satu quo.' 
''Plaintiff had little or no cause for an extend-
ed delay in rescinding as he does not claim he was 
subsequently led to believe that he would be able 
to secure water sufficient to irrigate 960 acres or 
any substantial part thereof. Even when he re-
ceived permission to drill two wells at his own 
risk, he could not possibly have thought they would 
be sufficient to irrigate the entire 1 ra(·t. As a mat-
ter of fact, he attempted to induce defendant to 
reduce the number of acres he would he n•qui n•d 
to purchase under the contract when it h<·<·amL· 
apparent to him that it would be difficult if no1 
impossible to secure enough water for his pur-
poses. For almost a year plaintiff va<'ilah•d h<'-
tween reliance on the contract, obtaining· a modi-
fied contract, abandonment of the <·cn1ra('~ aml 
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finally rescission. When he finally concluded to 
adopt the latter course, he still maintained his 
right to retain the benefits he received under the 
contract.'' 
Also in point isLe Vine vs. Whitehouse, 37 Utah 260, 
109 P. 2 (1910) which considered the question of alleged 
misrepresentations of LeVine and others respecting the 
value of stock received by the Whitehouses in part pay-
ment of the land covered by the contract. It was con-
tended that the alleged misrepresentations rendered the 
contract "unfair, unjust and inequitable." Levine during 
the negotiations for the purchase of the land represented 
the stock to be worth 50 cents per share, and stated that 
none had been sold for less than that sum. It was appar-
ent, however, that \Vhitehouse must have known that the 
~tock had only speculative value which fact was discov-
ered by him about a month after the agreement was 
entered into. \Vhitehouse continued to accept payments 
on the contract for eleYen months after he learned the 
stock was practically valueless. ~\.s a matter of fact it 
wasn't until the \Yhitehouses filed their amended answer 
-nearly ~~~ years after they discovered the alleged 
fraud- that the plaintiffs learned that the Whitehouses 
were ~eeking a reseission of the contract based on the 
alleged misrepresentations. Said the court: 
• • ... the great weight of authority holds that, if 
the party defrauded continues to receiYe benefits 
under the contract after he has become aware of 
thP fraud, he will be deemed to lurn? affirmed the 
cont rnet and wain.)d his rigl1t to rescind. In 9 Cyc. 
-l36, the rule is terst)I~·. and, as we think, correctly, 
stated as follows: • rrhe party defrauded will gen-
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erally lose his right to rescind if he takes any bene-
fit under the contract or does any other act which 
implies an intention to abide by it or an affirmance 
of it after he has become aware of the fraud.' * * * 
' ... the party who has been misled is required, as 
soon as he learns the truth and discovers the fals-
ity of the statements on which he relied, with all 
reasonable diligence to disaffirm the contract, and 
give the other party an opportunity of rescinding 
it, and of restoring both of them to their original 
position. The party deceived is not allowed to go 
on deriving all possible benefit from the transac-
tion, and then claim to be relieved from his own 
obligations by a rescission or a refusal to execute.' 
''Tested by this principle, the acts and con-
duct of the defendants J. W. and Ettie Whitehouse 
after they learned that the stock had no actual or 
market value must be held to be a waiver on their 
part of whatever right, if any, they had to rescind 
the contract because of the alleged fraudulent rep-
resentations made to them respecting the value of 
the stock. '' 
Fleming based his action for rescission on two basic 
grounds: (1) he was induced to enter into the agreement 
by reason of fraudulent representations regarding (a) 
Fleming's prospective management of the business (H. 3, 
4); (b) Joseph H. Felt's retirement (R. 3), and (c) the 
quality of the Felt merchandise. (R. 4) 
(2) Breach of the agreement by the Felts by reason 
of (a) interference with his duties as general manager 
(R. 2, 3, 5); (b) refusal to let Fleming purchase thP I1\·lt 
shares in the company. (R. 5) 
31 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
As already pointed out and discussed above, the 
Court found (1) that Marie Felt and Joseph H. Felt had 
made fraudulent representations as to Fleming's pros-
pective management of the business and retirement of 
Joseph H. Felt (Finding of Fact 8, R. 272) ; ( 2) that the 
Felts refused to permit Fleming to carry out his duties 
as general manager (Findings of Fact Nos. 7 and 11, R. 
272), and (3) that the Felts refused Fleming's tender to 
purchase the Felt shares (Findings of Fact Nos. 11 and 
12, R. 272, 273). 
Now turning to the record, the undisputed evidence 
shows the following: 
On September 1, 1953, Fleming brought his inventory 
to Salt Lake City and commenced joint operations with 
the Felts. (R. 62) On the same date Fleming commenced 
acting as general manager. (R. 63) They operated to-
gether nearly three months before the contract was 
signed. (R. 58) During this time at least three proposed 
drafts of the contract were rejected by Fleming. (R. 105) 
\\'"hen the drafts were brought to him, he studied them 
and knew what he was signing. (R. 105) He knew what 
he was signing when he signed the contract in the last part 
of Non•mlH~r. 1953. (R.. 105) During the three months' 
period prior to the signing of the contract, Fleming had 
H<'<'PHH to tlw inn~ntory and l1e and the Felts were selling 
therefrom. (R ;>S. 106) He l1ad been through the inven-
tor~· sc.>\·t•rnl times. (R. 58) Before signing the contract, 
hP had P\.t'll qm•stioned the t~xistenre of obsolete merchan-
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dise (R. 59) and he was also concerned about the fact 
that Joseph Felt was the president of the corporation. 
(R. 59) But he still signed the contract, though the same 
was dated back to August 31, 1953. (R. 8) 
After eight months of operating together he pro-
posed some changes in the operations which, according 
to Fleming, were objected to by the Felts (R. 67-69), but 
he continued to act for approximately the next fifteen 
months as the general manager of the corporation pur-
suant to the contract, drew his salary, and gave no notice 
of any rescission. Incidentally, Fleming admits that some 
of the proposed changes were carried out. (R. 67, 68) 
In January, 1955, Mr. Joseph H. Felt complained to 
Fleming that the business was losing money. (R. 70) The 
complaint was based on a self-prepared financial state-
ment. (R. 70) The examination of the statement of in-
come and expense for the period from September 1, 1953, 
through February 28, 1955, justifies Mr. Felt's concern. 
(Exhibit 12-P, R. 265) 
Following this meeting, and in the latter part of 
January, 1955, Fleming posted a notice of what he con-
sidered his duties as general manager to be. (R. 71) 
After a few days the sign was removed by Joseph H. Felt. 
(R. 71) According to Marie Felt, Joseph H. Felt said, 
"I am taking this down because it is embarrassing to us 
when the other people come in.'' ( R. 238) According 1 o 
Marie Felt, Fleming replied, ''I am the most surprised 
33 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
man in the world; I thought you folks would blow up and 
fire me as general manager, then I was going to sue you 
for breach of contract." (R. 217) 
This undoubtedly was a matter of spite on the part of 
Fleming, for the unrefuted testimony of Mrs. Felt was 
that all employees had previously been given a copy of 
the notice and all were perfectly aware of the provisions 
therein without posting the same where every customer 
coming into the place of business could see it. (R. 216) 
In any event, Fleming made no attempt then to 
rescind the contract. Instead, he continued to assert his 
prerogatives as general manager and drew his salary. He 
even fired Mr. Felt. (R. 74) About two or three weeks 
later, he also fired :Mrs. Felt. (R. 74) This was about 
March 1, 1955. (R. 74) \Vhat better evidence could there 
be demonstrating Fleming's determination to stand on 
the contract and assert his rights thereunder 1 There was 
no attempt to rescind the contract and he continued to 
serve as general manager and draw his salary. 
Thereafter, on June 1, 1955, contrary to any conduct 
consistent with rescission and again asserting his rights 
under the contract, Fleming tendered a check for $200.00 
to the Felts as a first payment on the purchase price of 
the Felt stock. (R. 75) The check was returned. (R. 75) 
On June 8, still asserted his rights thereunder, he made 
an appintment with the Felts after normal business hours 
to meet him n t the place of business. He hadn't told them 
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the purpose for the appointment. (R. 75, 227) There 
he tendered them $200.00 cash as a first payment on the 
shares of stock belonging to the Felts. (R. 75, 228) 
According to Fleming it was refused, (R. 75) but not 
unequivocally, for according to Fleming's own testimony, 
Mr. Felt asked Mr. Fleming to go to his attorney's office. 
(R. 76) By this date both Mr. and Mrs. Felt had been 
fired. (R. 227) Mrs. Felt's testimony is not contradicted 
and essentially agrees with Fleming's, i. e. that the Felts 
did not unequivocally refuse the $200.00 payment but still 
wanted the benefit of legal counsel as to whether they 
should accept the $200.00 payment or reject it. (R. 228) 
But the point is this - as late as June 8, 1955, over 
twenty-one months since the commencement of operations, 
Fleming was still affirming the contract and asserting his 
rights thereunder. His conduct was entirely inconsistent 
with a rescission of the same. 
The appellants submit that by his own conduct in 
continuing to assert his prerogatives as general man-
ager, continuing to draw his salary pursuant to the con-
tract, and demanding his rights thereunder to purchase 
the Felts' stock, Fleming, up to June 8, 1955, had waived 
any cause for rescission if any he may have had up to that 
time. By affirming the contract on June 8, 1955, he can-
not now go behind that date and point to certain acts as 
meritorious grounds for rescission -even if they were. 
As a matter of fact, it was not until July 26, 1955, 
nearly twenty-three months after the commencement of 
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joint operations and a month and a half ·after his last 
act affirming the contract, that he notified the Felts of 
his intention to rescind the contract, but in so doing he 
demanded the return of all of his initial inventory or the 
sum of $13,511.52. (R. 130, 131) There was, of course, 
no basis for interposing such a condition to the rescission 
of the contract. 
Nor could the circumstances on June 8, 1955, be the 
basis of any action for rescission. The tender of $200.00 
was not refused unequivocally. (R. 228) The Felts only 
wanted the benefit of legal counsel, to which they were 
entitled. 
Even if there had been an outright refusal to accept 
the $200.00 payment on June 8, 1955, such would not con-
stitute a ground for rescinding the contract. Payments 
totaling $33,269.00 were to be made over a period of years. 
( R. 8) Certainly an outright refusal of a mere $200.00 
payment would not be such a substantial breach as to 
\varrant rescission. The refusal of the one $200.00 pay-
ment would not, by itself and under the particular cir-
cumstances, be grom1ds for anticipating the refusal to 
accept the balanee of the purchase price in the sum of 
$:33,069.00. There is not one shred of evidence of any 
net dmw or of any statement made by the Felts indi-
cating that there was any intention on their part to refuse 
1 ht> ha lmH·c of the purchase price. 
The record in this case shows unmistakably that ac-
corrling to the deeision of this Court, Fleming should be 
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denied rescission of the contract on the grounds of waiver, 
laches and estoppel. 
POINT NO. IV 
FINDINGS OF FACT NOS. 7 AND 11 CANNOT 
REASONABLY BE SUSTAINED BY THE EVI-
DENCE, AND EVEN IF THEY WERE, THEY DO 
NOT SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT OF RECISSION. 
Findings of Fact Nos. 7 and 11 are as follows : 
(R. 272) 
"7. That on or about the 23rd day of May, 1955, 
the plaintiffs' duties as general manager, 
without reason or any cause, provocation 
or excuse, were wrongfully transferred by 
the said corporation, acting through and by 
its Board of Directors at a duly and regu-
larly called meeting of the President of the 
said defendant corporation, Joseph H. 
Felt. * * * 
'' 11. That the defendants refused to permit the 
plaintiff to carry out his duties as general 
manager and refused plaintiff's tender to 
buy defendants' stock. Plaintiff kept or 
offered to keep and perform all of the pro-
visions of said agreement.'' 
It is apparent that the foregoing Findings of \;,ad~ 
had little to do with the decision reached by the trial 
court. That they influenced the trial court very little is 
evidenced from the first paragraph of the judgment 
wherein the contract is specifically rescinded as '' inequi-
table and illegal." (R. 275) The real basis for the judg-
ment is, therefore, clear on its face - the supposed 
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illegality of the contract. As already pointed out, the 
trial court in its memorandum decision deals exclusively 
with the supposed invalidity of the contract itself. 
(R. 266-268.) 
However, lest the Supreme Court feel that such 
Findings of Fact might possibly serve as the basis for 
rescinding the contract, Point No. 4 is included herein. 
Finding of Fact No.7 is obviously based on the evi-
dence showing that on May 23, 1953, the corporation act-
ing through and by its Board of Directors adopted by-
laws which had theretofore never been passed, and which 
in paragraphs Nos. 1 and 4 of Article II thereof provided 
as follows: (Exhibit 2-P, R. 265) 
''I. That a board of five directors shall be 
chosen annually by the stockholders at 
their annual meeting, to manage the af-
fairs of the company. Their term of office 
shall be one year, and until their succes-
sors are elected and qualified. 
''IV. The directors shall ha-ve the general man-
agement control of the business and af-
fairs of the company and shall exercise all 
the powers that may be exercised or per-
formed by the corporation.'· 
Also. on j[ny ~3, 1953, the directors of the corpora-
tion pn~sed the following resolution (Exhibit 3-P): 
'·RESOLVED, that all eherks, drafts and notes 
nnd other negotiable instruments, and all evi-
dt'lH't>~ of indebtedness of this company shall be 
1'\igned hy the \'"ice-President and countersigned 
hy the President or Serretary-Treasurer, and that 
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no checks be paid or accepted after this meeting 
·without such signatures.'' 
With respect to that portion of the by-laws above re-
ferred to, there is no basis for the contention that Flem-
ing's duties as general manager were wrongfully trans-
ferred. Such provisions and by-laws are generally found 
in any set of articles of incorporation or by-laws, and only 
affirm the inherent power vested in any board of corpo-
rate directors by virtue of Section 16-2-21, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, which provides in part as follows: 
"The corporate powers of the corporation 
shall be exercised by the Board of Directors .... '' 
Certainly the contract of August 31, 1953 does not 
and for that matter could not divest the Board of Direc-
tors of their ultimate duty to exercise the powers of the 
corporation as required by statute. As already pointed 
out in Point I hereof, the existence of a general manager 
is a common arrangement entirely consistent with the 
statute, but a general manager would only be vested 
with powers properly delegable by the Board of Direc-
tors. The ultimate powers of the corporation must always 
be exercised by the Board. As general manager, Flem-
ing could not supersede the Board of Directors. There is 
no basis whatsoever for Finding No.7. In addition, it iH 
submitted that there is a total absence of evidence of any 
conduct on the part of the Felts taken pursuant to the 
by-laws that interfered with Fleming's management of 
the business. 
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As for the resolution curtailing Fleming's authority 
to issue checks by himself, it should be pointed out that 
Fleming, at the time the resolution was passed, was the 
vice-president of the corporation, and thus his signature 
was still necessary in the issuance of all checks. Neither 
Joseph H. Felt nor Marie Felt could by themselves issue 
any checks of the corporation. Certainly it is not contrary 
to good corporate practice, nor in violation of the agree-
ment of August 31, 1953, that the signature of the vice-
president should be accompanied by the signature of the 
president or secretary of the corporation. There is not 
one iota of evidence to even suggest nor does the law re-
quire that the signing of checks was a right belonging 
solely and exclusively to the general manager. This is 
authority which Fleming only presumed to possess. On 
page 72 of the record, Fleming seems to infer that the 
~igning of checks was his sole authority. It is true that 
h f' had been signing alone prior to the passing of the 
resolution, but there is nothing to suggest that this should 
always be his prerogative. This was only Fleming's inter-
pretation of the contract. It is submitted that the reso-
lution passed by the Board of Directors with respect to 
the is~nanc.e of corporate checks could not reasonably 
st\n·p ns a basis for Finding Xo. I. and that Finding of 
r.,aet X o. 7 is without support of the eYidence in the 
f(lCOrd. 
As n matfl>r of fact, the examination of the evidence 
011 this point indic.atPs that the majority of the Board of 
llin,ctors only had the corporate interests in mind when 
t Jw n'solntion wns passed. Fleming admitted that he took 
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corpo;rate funds and established a separate account in the 
name of" A. Fred Fleming, Special Account." (R. 72-73) 
While he testified that he did not expend any of these 
funds for any other than corporate purposes, he was 
surely acting improperly to establish a personal account 
with the corporate funds. Check No. 2100 (Exhibit 7-D) 
was drawn by Fleming for this questionable purpose. 
Fleming admitted upon cross-examination (R. 121) 
that cheek No. 2100 (Exhibit 7-D) was taken from the 
bottom of the check book at a place where Marie Felt 
would not easily notice its absence. (R. 122) It was only 
after he had made out check No. 2100 for the sum of 
$1200 (Exhibit 7 -D) that the resolution curtailing his 
authority to sign checks was passed on May 23, 1955. 
(R. 123) On this point the unrefuted testimony of Mrs. 
Felt was that when she learned that the $1200.00 check 
had been drawn, she accused 2\Ir. Fleming of being dis-
honest, to which he replied that what he did "was good 
business." (R. 224) 
Finding of Fact No. 11 is also without support of 
the evidence of the record. The contract is entirely silent 
as to what the precise duties of the general manager con-
sisted of, nor was there any previous proceeding in which 
the same had been determined nor was any evidt-lH't- in-
troduced of any subsequent agreement bet\\'('('11 tlw par-
ties defining these duties. Mr. Fleming, on di red exami-
nation, did testify that after he had been in the business 
some eight months he did propose certain changes in tlw 
operation, which changes were allegedly opposed by the 
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Felts but were later inaugurated. (R. 67-69) Apparently 
this was not very serious for Fleming continued to serve 
as general manager of the corporation for the next fifteen 
months. Marie Felt in her testimony outlined many of 
the important duties of the general manager of the corpo-
ration. (R. 221-223) None of these duties were inter-
fered with. On this point the testimony of Marie Felt 
was unrefuted. 
There is no basis for that part of Finding of Fact No. 
11, which states that the Felts "refused plaintiff's tender 
to buy defendants' stock.'' This matter has already been 
discussed in Point No. III hereof. It is not sustained 
by the evidence. As already pointed out, the evidence 
does not show that there was an unequivocal refusal to 
accept plaintiff's tender to buy the Felts' stock. The tes-
timony of Fleming and of Marie Felt can be harmonized 
on this point, and both indicate that the desire of the 
Felts was that they have the benefit of legal counsel in 
taking any step which might haTe far-reaching legal con-
st>quences. As already pointed out, even if there had been 
an unequivocal refusal to accept the tender, certainly the 
refusal of one $200.00 payment is so insignificant when 
compared to the purchase price of $33,269.00 that such 
n hreach would hP completely unsubstantial and incon-
~<'quential. Then~ is not one statement or shred of evi-
d<'JH'<' iHdicnting- that eYen if the tender were refused 
t Ita t such n refusal amounted to an anticipatory breach 
of t hut portion of the contract granting Fleming the 
right to purchase the Felts • stork. Nothing suggests 
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that the refusal of this first payment would amount to a 
refusal to accept the next $33,069.00. 
''The right to rescind is an extreme one and 
does not arise from every breach, and the general 
rule is that a rescission will not be permitted for a 
slight or casual breach of the contract, but only for 
such breaches as are so substantial and funda-
mental as to defeat the object of the parties in 
making the agreement.'' 17 CJS, Contracts, Sec-
tion 442, page 906. 
Furthermore, for the reasons already discussed at 
length in point No. III hereof, Fleming waived any right 
he may have had to seek a rescission of the contract on 
the grounds of any breach of the contract on the part of 
the Felts. As already pointed out, right up to and in-
cluding June 8, 1955, Fleming was standing on the con-
tract, asserting rights thereunder and enjoying the fruits 
thereof. 
Findings of Fact Nos. 7 and 11 are without the sup-
port of the evidence. They do not support the judgment 
for rescision. 
POINT V 
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A MONEY 
JUDGMENT. 
Appellants have heretofore argued that there is no 
legal justification for a judgment of rescission in this 
action. Without waiving their contention in this regard 
or minimizing the emphasis placed thereon, if for any 
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reason the Court is of the opinion that the Respondent 
is entitled to a rescission Appellants maintain that Re-
spondent is not entitled to a money judgment. 
It is axiomatic that in a judgment for rescission the 
court will attempt to restore the parties to their origi-
nal position. Initially Respondent contributed merchan-
dise only to the joint business of the parties. He put up 
no cash. Yet the trial court, apparently, without giving 
any consideration as to whether any of the property con-
tributed by Respondent was available for return to Re-
spondent, entered a money judgment for the value 
thereof. In this the Court erred. 
There is no question but what a court of equity un-
der certain circumstances has jurisdiction to award a 
money judgment in cases of rescission; but it will not do 
so if the parties can otherwise be restored to their origi-
nal status quo. 
o:-r,-··· r.; -~. ',. 
,("· 8wii/1t v·: Talbot, 94 P. 238 (Cal.) was an action to 
cancel a bill of sale and restore the personal property to 
the plaintiff. The court awarded a money judgment, but 
only because the court also found that it was impracti-
cable to decree a restoration and return of the property. 
To the same effect is Blahnik Y. Small Farms Imp. Co .. 
184 P. 661 (Cal), where the Court stated, on page 663, 
"If the defendant had retained the title to the 
property, the most that the plaintiffs could haYe 
demanded upon the rescission would have been a 
reconveyance thereof to them. The defendant hav-
ing parted with the title thereto, and being unable 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to restore the plaintiffs to the position in which 
they were at the time of the contract was made, 
the rule in equity is that they must compensate 
the plaintiffs for the loss thereby sustained. This 
would not be the price at which the property had 
been accepted upon the contract of sale, but would 
be its value at that time, and it was therefore nec-
essary for the court to determine such value.'' 
The same result occurred in Paulter v. Man,uel, 108 P. 
749 (Okla.), where the property in question had been 
transferred to a bona fide purchaser. 
A money judgment against Appellants is tantamount 
to a forced sale of the property. Assuming, without ad-
mitting, that Respondent is entitled to a rescission, such 
does not entitle him to an inequitable and harsh remedy. 
Rescission is founded in equity, but equity will not resort 
to inequitable means to accomplish its results. 
In awarding a money judgment the Court apparently 
totally ignored the evidence which conclusively shows 
that there was property available which could have been 
returned to Respondent. 
The following are excerpts from Respondent's 
testimony: 
Q. You mentioned that your inventory-that is, 
an inventory that you contributed in the mer-
ger had a fast turnover. Approximately, how 
much of that was sold during the first six 
months1 
A. We approximately turned our inventory over 
the first six months, of the merchandise that I 
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put in the business, approximately twice; ap-
proximately twice in that length of time. 
Q. You say, the inventory which you contributed 
to the business was sold twice in the first six 
months? 
A. The value of the inventory of what I had in 
the business. 
Q. So that, there is very little now remaining of 
the inventory which you put into the business 1 
A. I didn't understand. 
Q. There is very little remaining of the mate-
rial- the inventory- which you put into the 
business? 
A. I don't know how much is remaining; I have 
no idea. 
Q. Well, at the time that you were there, there 
was very little remaining? 
A. At the time I was there, there was some re-
maining. 
Q. Would you say that a fourth of it "Tas 
remaining. 
A. I wouldn't know how much was remaining. 
Q. Would you say - would you know whether 
half of it was remaining? 
A. It could have been replaced. \V e replaced the 
inventory we sold, so there was inventory re-
maining; can I name some of the products 
we were selling, turned over fast~ 
Q. Yes. 
A. rrhat was the main part of our in Yen tory~ we 
were turning over Wynn Proofing Oil, \Yax-
Seal products, N eihof ignition, N eolite flash-
light batteries: those products - we were 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
doing eighty per cent of our business with 
twenty per cent of our mechandise. We would 
turn that over each month and buy more of 
that merchandise, so, when I went out of 
there, as far as the lines that I had in the 
business were concerned, we had them in the 
business, but we had re-bought them. (R. 132, 
133) 
The Respondent also testified as follows: 
Q. And that is the only time you offered to return 
any of those certificates~ 
A. I offered at other times to return them for my 
stock, but that was the time that I offered for-
mally, and endorsed it. That was the only time 
that I endorsed them and offered them. I 
never offered them any time after that. 
Q. So, each time you offered to return those cer-
tificates, you placed a condition on it, which 
was the return of your stock or $13,000-plus; 
is that correct~ 
A. Each time that I offered it, I offered for re-
turn of my stock and merchandise that I had 
put in the company. (R. 130, 131) 
Although the record is not clear as to exactly how 
much remained of the merchandise contributed by Re-
spondent, yet it is clear that there was some of the origi-
nal merchandise remaining and part which had been sold 
had been replaced. 
Furthermore, by Fleming's own testimony at least 
two per cent of his own original merchandise was obso-
lete. (R. 111) By the terms of the judgment, however, 
the Felts are even being forced to purchase this merchan-
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dise from Fleming at full market value, besides giving 
Fleming six per cent interest thereon from August 
31, 1953. 
That the replaced merchandise was of comparable 
value to the original merchandise is clear from the testi-
mony of the respondent, for at the time the Respondent 
offered to return the corporate stock there was either 
original or replaced merchandise on hand which he de-
manded for return of the stock. Such being the case, a 
money judgment against Appellants is without equity or 
justice, for it compels a forced sale of merchandise which 
Appellants should be allowed to return in kind to 
Respondent. 
The amount of the judgment is completely inequi-
table. Fleming and Felt commenced joint operations on 
September 1, 1953, and continued through June 8, 1955. 
Then, after nearly two years together, Fleming resigned 
and later brought an action to rescind the contract. 
vVhat was he granted? 
1. The total value of his inventory as of September 
1, 1953, with no consideration being given whatsoever to 
any business loss that was sustained during the period of 
joint operations. The only fina;nciaJ, statement admitted 
in evidence shows that there had been a capital impair-
ment of $2,235.47 and a net loss of $2,285.47-all under 
Pl nnin{l 's mama.rfenu'nt. 
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No wonder Fleming wanted to seek a rescission! 
2. In addition, Fleming was granted interest on the 
judgment of six per cent from the date of September 1, 
1953-the interest alone amounting to $3,311.08. While 
in some cases interest in a rescission matter might be 
proper, it is submitted that under the circumstances in 
this case it should not have been granted. 
3. In addition, the Court gave no consideration to the 
fact that Fleming drew his salary as general manager of 
$400.00 per month for nearly two years. This the Court 
permitted him to keep in total, even while granting a 
rescission of the contract. Is this restoring the parties to 
their status quo~ The answer is obvious. 
The only equitable way to grant a rescission, assum-
ing Fleming were entitled to it, would be to determine 
the total inventory as nearly as possible as of June 8, 
1955, and then divide the inventory in the ratio of 
13,511.32 (original dollar value of Fleming merchandise) 
to 33,269.00 (original dollar value of Felt merchandise). 
According to the judgment of the trial court, Flem-
ing, although having lost money for the company and 
impaired its capital, is permitted to realize in cash the 
total value of his original inventory; pick up six per cent 
interest on his initial investment and retain nearly 
$9,200.00 received as salary during his tenure as general 
manager. WHAT AN INVESTMENT! 
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The judgment is completely unrealistic and without 
equity or justice. It should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
McKAY, BURTON, McMILLAN 
AND RICHARDS 
720 Newhouse Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
and HAROLD R. BOYER, 
1409 Walker Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City. Utah 
Attorneys for Defendamts 
and Appellamts 
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